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In the second half of the nineteenth century, in the period after John Stuart Mill, and 
into and including the first third of the twentieth century, a group of philosophers, 
sociologists, economists and journalists, systematically adapted classical liberal 
arguments to make them relevant to the appalling social conditions generated by the 
development of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their writings 
contained distinctive models of society, of human nature, and of change, that are 
relevant to sociologists studying education in the twenty-first century.  My aim 
throughout this chapter will be to work through the arguments of the new liberals 
accepting those that meet the tests of a critical interrogation as being relevant to 
twenty-first century global capitalism, and adapting or rejecting them as is 
appropriate.  Although some of their arguments will be found wanting, I will argue 
that their original ideas in defence of social democracy can be restated in terms of 
developments in science and philosophy over a century since they wrote.  
Developments in post-quantum complexity theory, within both the physical and social 
sciences, will enable us to re-ground social democratic arguments and state them in a 
more plausible way for the twenty-first century.  
 
The sociology of John Atkinson Hobson 
 
In the last decades of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century the 
economist John Atkinson Hobson advanced a justification for the welfare state 
complementing the contributions of T. H. Green and L.T. Hobhouse. In a way similar 
to Hobhouse’s ‘harmonic principle,’ Hobson’s analysis of individual and society was 
facilitated methodologically by the organic model of social structure. The organic 
model was analogical in that it likened society to a ‘social organism’. In utilizing such 
an analogy Hobson invoked comparisons with the Hegel and German Idealism which 
created alarm amongst classical liberals.  In developing his conception of the organic 
view, Hobson was influenced by John S. Mackenzie whose book An Introduction to 
Social Philosophy (2006), originally published in 1890, developed a coherent 
conception of the organic to challenge both the monadistic view (of classical 
liberalism and Leibniz) and the monistic view, which asserted the priority of the 
whole over the parts (Idealism). The organic view sees the individual as determined 
by social conditions.  In this sense, the relation of individual to society is an ‘intrinsic 
one’ (p. 150). Society is not a mere aggregate of separate individuals, nor is it a 
mechanist (dualist) or chemical combination of them.  The evidence that it is not a 
monistic system is that if that were the case, as society changed, so the parts would 
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change almost simultaneously.  This is not to say that there is not an aspect of the 
monadic, and an aspect of the monistic, which operate at different times and places, in 
different contexts, for there are mixed modes; just as complexity does not completely 
displace mechanism, but rather should be seen as supplementing or extending it. 
Further, although we are all penetrated and constituted by our surroundings this does 
not mean that we are all the same.  As MacKenzie put it, there is no contradiction 
between social determinism and the independence of the individual: 
 
That there is no contradiction between the independence which is now claimed 
for the individual and the fact of his social determination, becomes evident when 
we consider the nature of that determination and of that independence.  That the 
individual is determined by his society, means merely that his life is an 
expression of the general spirit of the social atmosphere in which he lives.  And 
that the individual is independent, means merely that the spirit which finds 
expression in him is a living force that may develop by degrees into something 
different (2006, p. 158). 
 
Hobson’s use of the organic metaphor is compatible with Mackenzie’s and like 
Mackenzie’s it has received stringent criticism. As R.N. Berki (1981, pp. 193-4) 
notes, Hobson was frequently characterised as an idealist and his idealism was “born 
of the endeavour to comprehend political reality in unitary terms.” Although Hobson 
claimed to reject the monistic doctrine of Idealism, in that he rejected prioritising the 
force of the whole over the parts, he was idealist in the weaker sense that he still saw 
society as a unified whole. Such a whole in his sense was merely a system of 
interactions and unity was represented as not incompatible with difference.  Besides, 
Hobson did not see unity itself of value, but recognised specific normative criteria 
drawing on Ruskin’s concept of life as determining the conditions for inclusion and 
exclusion from the whole.  The common good is thus represented by Hobson as a 
unified development of the whole society which contrasts from those aspects which 
are dysfunctional, evil, or represent what he termed, following Ruskin, illth. This is 
the sense that David Long detects idealism in Hobson’s approach for he “idealistically 
condemned present arrangements for failing to come up to the standards of his 
rational ideal” (1996, p. 16).   
 
Although not problem-free, Long concludes that “the organic analogy remains a 
useful start for a holistic analysis of society and Hobson’s use of the analogy was 
certainly progressive for his time” (1996, p. 16).  One must not expect too much from 
an analogical method of course.  It must be seen, as is true for all analogies, as 
comprising both likenesses and unlikenesses.  Human societies are in some ways like 
living things but in others not.  For classical liberals, the analogy does not do justice 
to the issue of the claimed independence of individual consciousness. One can also 
criticize the analogical weighting given to uneven influence of the central organs over 
other parts of the body.  Yet, in that it differentiates a particular form of unity from 
those types characteristic of monism, monadism, chemical integration, or mechanical 
solidarity, it presents a certain viability even given its analogical limitations.   
 
One possible sense that the organic model can be criticised was its implications for 
conservativism.  Although Hobson wrote against the politics of conservativism, John 
Allett (1990, p. 74) argues that “there is a significant conservative aspect to Hobson’s 
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thought.”   In Allett’s view, “Hobson’s conservativism is centred in his sociology” (p. 
76).  As he puts it: 
 
Hobson’s interest in conservativism is limited primarily to its usefulness as a 
corrective (not an alternative) to liberal individualism.  There are occasions, 
however, when he engages in a kind of high moralizing about supra-individual 
forces of restraint that threatens to propel him beyond liberalism and its ultimate 
commitment to the self-directing personality.  
 
The entailment of conservatism can not simply derive from the axiom of 
interdependence, or from the recognition of society as structure separate from its parts, 
but must reside in privileging unity or harmony above what is normatively required by 
life. While Hobson would have disputed any such charge, appealing to the independent 
normativity of his notions of life and illth, it may be that the model of organicism 
exerts, as Allett sees it, an independent pressure for unity and the status quo at the 
expense of justice or equality implied by a model of democratic socialism.  
 
To the extent that the organic analogy coerces undue support for unity, I want to 
suggest that complexity theory can offer a more nuanced model in order to theorize the 
relations between individuals and social structures, as well as to theorize conception of 
causality, change, or evolution, creativity, originality, agency, and much else besides.  
Indeed, I will claim, it provides a revised model for social science, and especially for 
educational research.  Although Hobson recognised certain complexity formulations, in 
most senses the organic analogy still conforms to the prevailing notions of 
Enlightenment science in its focus on closed, deterministic and integrable systems. In 
contrast, complexity theory represents a shift from matter-based to an energy-based 
physics, and offers a non-reductionist conception of the relationship between parts and 
whole which stresses the open nature of systems and where difference and unity are 
paired in a new and novel manner.   
 
Complexity theories thus provide better models which enable an avoidance of 
conservative priority on unity or the status quo, do not prioritise the whole over the 
parts, or the spiritual over the material, and are compatible with recent post-quantum 
traditions in science as they have developed in the twentieth century. Although having 
roots in ancient Chinese and Greek thought, versions of complexity theory are a relatively new 
field of scientific enquiry, and are perhaps one of the most notable new developments since the 
advent of quantum theory in the early 1900s. Such theories are not only compatible with 
materialism, but are systemic, or holist, in that they account for diversity and unity in the 
context of a systemic field of complex interactional changes.   
 
In his book Complexity and Postmodernism, Paul Cilliers (1998, p. viii) defines complexity in 
the following way: 
 
In a complex system…the interaction constituents of the system, and the interaction 
between the system and its environment, are of such a nature that the system as a whole 
cannot be fully understood simply by analysing its components.  Moreover, these 
relationships are not fixed, but shift and change, often as a result of self-organisation. 
This can result in novel features, usually referred to in terms of emergent properties. The 
brain, natural language and social systems are complex. 
 
Cilliers presents a useful contemporary summary and update of complexity research.  Complex 
systems interact dynamically in a non-linear and asymmetrical manner.  Interactions take place 
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in open systems through ‘self-organisation’ by adapting dynamically to changes in both the 
environment and the system.  Self-organisation is an emergent property of the system as a 
whole. An emergent property is a property that is constituted due to the combination of 
elements in the system as a whole. As such it is a property possessed by the system but not by 
its components
1
.  Cilliers (1998, p. 90) defines ‘self-organisation’ as “the capacity of complex 
systems which enables them to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and 
adaptively in order to cope with or manipulate the environment”.  Such systems are not in 
equilibrium because constantly changing as a consequence of interaction between system and 
environment, and as well as being influenced by external factors are influenced by the history 
of the system (1998, p. 66). Cilliers identifies social systems, the economy, the human brain, 
and language as complex systems
2
. 
 
In the recent history of science, the work of Ilya Prigogine (1980, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1997, 
2003) has advanced the field of post-quantum complexity analysis at the macroscopic and 
microscopic levels, based in non-equilibrium physics, linked to the significant work of the 
Solvay Institutes for Physics and Chemistry.  Prigogine received a Nobel Prize in 1977.  Like 
Nietzsche and others before him, he translated the effects of a theory of becoming, based on 
an Heraclitean idea of ceaseless change, providing a post-quantum understanding of the 
universe in terms of dimensions of chance, self-organisation, unpredictability, uncertainty, 
chaos, non-equilibrium systems, bifurication and change.  Prigogine’s central contribution 
was to non-equilibrium statistical mechanics and thermodynamics and the probabilistic 
analysis of dissipative structures (2003, pp. 45, 82).  His main ideas (expressed non-
mathematically) were that “nature leads to unexpected complexity” (2003, p. 8); that “self-
organization appears in nature far from equilibrium” (p. vii); that “the universe is evolving” 
(p. 9); that the messages of Parmenides (that nothing changes) must be replaced by those of 
Heraclitus (that everything always changes) (pp. 9, 56); that “time is our existential 
dimension” (p. 9); that “the direction of time is the most fundamental property of the 
universe” (p. 64); that nothing is predetermined (p. 9); that non-equilibrium, time-
irreversibility, feedback, non-integration, and bifurication are features of all systems, 
including evolution, which is to say that our universe is full of nonlinear, irreversible non-
determined processes (p. 59); that life creates evolution (p. 61, 65), and that everything is 
historical (p. 64)
3
.  Writing over the same period as Michel Foucault
4
, he was concerned to 
analyse irreversible processes that generate successively higher levels of organisational 
complexity, where the complex phenomena are not reducible to the initial states from which 
they emerged. His work has been especially important for understanding changes within open 
systems
5
, for theorizing time as a real dimension
6
, and for theorizing interconnectedness as a 
“characteristic feature of nature” (2003, p. 54)7.  Of especial relevance, his work theorizes the 
possibilities of chance as the outcome of system contingencies
8
. 
 
Prigogine speaks highly about Henri Bergson. Although in his famous debate with 
Einstein, Bergson clearly misunderstood relativity theory, he was right about the issue 
of time, says Prigogine (2003, p. 61).  For Bergson, time was a real dimension, and 
contrary to classical views, saw it as irreversible: “We do not think real time. But we 
live it, because life transcends intellect” (p. 46). The irreversibility of time dictates the 
impossibility of turning back, as well as the irreversibility of decisions and actions. 
The broader view is one of life and the universe as changing where time means 
creation and elaboration of novel and original patterns.  It enables an understanding of 
how each individual is shaped by her society and yet unique. In such a conception 
where duration represents the real dimension of time: 
 
consciousness cannot go through the same state twice.  The 
circumstances may still be the same, but they will act no longer on the 
same person, since they find him at a new moment in his history.  Our 
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personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated 
experience, changes without ceasing.  By changing, it prevents any state, 
although superficially identical with another, from ever repeating it in its 
very depth.  That is why our duration is irreversible (1998, pp. 5-6). 
 
New actions will take place at new times. Life changes constantly and new states are 
never precisely repeated in identical form. In drawing from Bergson, Prigogine (2003, 
p. 20) notes how such a thermodynamic vision once again makes individual agency 
pivotal. Independence develops not apart from the system, but in and through the 
system.  
 
Such a complex analysis which retains a conception of individual agency within 
system parameters was also centrally important for Hobson.  In order to give his 
theory normative anchorage, Hobson utilises a philosophy of life.  It was certainly 
Hobson’s normative vision to promote enhanced well-being and human welfare as 
central. In accord with life philosophy, it was Ruskin who gave Hobson his concept of 
social welfare.  This involved redefining the concept of wealth a way from a concern 
with exchange, to a concern with its intrinsic worth, or as Allett (1981, p. 18) puts it, 
for its “life sustaining properties.”  In representing individuals as social beings, 
Hobson echoed the insights of Mackenzie who had written that “[i]t is only through 
the development of the whole human race that any one man can develop” (Mackenzie, 
1890, p. 180).  This is a crucial theoretical axiom from the standpoint of educational 
analysis for it formulates the social democratic idea that it is the way we organise the 
society at large and its institutional structures that is so crucial for the development of 
each and every person.  In such a view, the entire social democratic structure of 
society is a prerequisite for the application of liberal principles, for uneven 
development and social inequality negate the significance of liberal ideals such as 
freedom.   
 
It was the inadequacy of representing individuals as solitary atoms that Hobson 
derived the central importance of social and institutional organisation.  What 
frequently went unacknowledged was the assistance which individuals utilised in 
achieving their plans.  To embark on a business initiative, for instance, presupposes 
sufficient acumen, skills, knowledge, resources, capital, and infrastructures, which 
presuppose their availability in institutional form. Production thus has a ‘social 
element’ underpinning it. So, too, does individual development, for each human being 
could only develop with various familial, educational, and community assistance.  
Once one acknowledges this, one sees that the development of adequate social 
structures is a prerequisite for individual development.  
 
Progress for Hobson was concerned with enhancing well-being which exalted human 
welfare as the end or good to be sought after.  For Hobson, welfare was a necessary 
social good.  It is through his focus on welfare that he develops his economic 
philosophy concerned to develop the well-being of all of the international community 
and all humanity. Work was the medium through which individuals and societies 
would invest creative energy for production and progress.  It was work that generated 
‘the power to sustain life.’ 9 
 
Hobson recognised that society was more than the separate individuals who 
comprised it and that classical liberalism could not adequately theorise the organic 
 6 
relations of individuals within society. It was based on such a view that he advanced 
his theory of surplus
10
. He theorized surplus as arising through organised cooperation 
which was essential to social and economic production.  It is through cooperation that 
individuals produce more than is possible simply as a function of each individual 
contribution
11.  Cooperation is thus a productive power in Hobson’s theory, both 
productivity and well-being being increased by it.   
 
It was from his theory of cooperation that Hobson developed his theory of 
underconsumption which has been his chief contribution to economic theory and was 
to have a major influence on Keynes.  In his classic book co-authored with A. F. 
Mummery, The Industrial System, underconsumption is represented as the 
manifestation of dysfunctional economic development which distorts the system of 
the distribution of wealth and income by creating waste and inequality. Capitalism 
inherently supports a system of distorted development. The very process by which 
unproductive surplus was obtained, by business cunning and other strategies of 
deception, meant that the overall distribution and investment lacked any correlation 
with what the future of humanity required. Hobson proposed that a rational law of 
distribution would be in accord with human needs and capacities thus affirming an 
affinity with democratic socialism of a distinctively social democratic variety.  
 
Underconsumption was a surplus of production and too little consumption.  It was an 
economy with not enough spending. In Hobson’s view, underconsumption results 
from three principal causes: overproduction, over-saving, and unequal distribution of 
surplus. It was the over-savings aspect that Keynes responded to. For Keynes’ Hobson 
failed to distinguish savings from investment. In Keynes’s theory, it was the 
distinction between savings and investment that became central to his break from 
neoclassical economics.  Too much saving in his view resulted in too little 
investment, and hence the classical adage concerning the virtues of thrift were 
incorrect from the point of view of benefit to the community. It was for this reason the 
Keynes  favoured public spending and government direction of investment to restore 
demand in aggregate spending, whereas Hobson advocated a more moral and political 
argument against unregulated capitalism.  
 
Keynes can, in this sense, be seen as part of a tradition of social democratic thinking 
which developed from the 1870s to the 1930s. In his later life he acknowleged a great 
respect to Hobson’s influence. His great contribution to social democracy was his 
appreciation of complexity dynamics as effecting outcomes which rendered 
traditional neoclassical conceptions of equilibrium effectively redundant. In this 
sense, he took Hobson’s organic analogy, and rendered it more fittingly as a 
complexity model.   
 
His conception of uncertainty was not seen as something which could be overcome, or 
which only operated in certain situations, but arose as a consequence of the 
complexity created by real time. Because individuals’ actions in time created unique 
patterns it was theoretically impossible to predict or foretell future events.  As he 
states: 
 
We have, as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct 
consequences of our acts….Thus the fact that our knowledge of the future is 
fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable topic for 
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the methods of classical economic theory….[A]bout these matters there is no 
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatsoever.  We 
simply do not know (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-214). 
 
Keynes proposed in The General Theory (1953, p. 152) that in such a situation the 
only recourse is reliance on rules or conventions as to how the economy ought to 
work in order to produce stability through institutional coordination.  He thus 
incorporates post-quantum complexity themes avant la lettre. This is especially 
important in relation to his conception of real time which underpins his views on 
ignorance, uncertainty, and human agency.  His conception of real time replaces the 
traditional Newtonian conception which characterized neoclassical economics as well 
as standard models of science. As O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985) explain it, Newtonian 
time is spatialized, represented as a succession of points (continuous time), or line 
segments (discrete time) (p. 53), and is characterized by homogeneity, mathematical 
continuity and causal inertness (p. 54). For Bergson (1998, p. 338), change, or 
succession, is not real in the Newtonian theory. When it is conceived as a real 
addititive dimension, no matter how much action reproduces the patterns of the past, 
any future actions will be unique for the context of repetition will always vary.  
 
It is this reconfiguration of time through the recognition of complexity that results in 
the emphasis on uncertainty in Keynes’s work.  Uncertainty also incorporates novelty, 
non-repeatability, and unpredictability, and also entails indeterminism in decisions. It 
thus asserts a thesis of creative human agency and imperfect foresight and knowledge.  
While creative decision-making is possible, it is in relation to a world that is not only 
unknown but unknowable.  Hence the importance of ignorance means: “[t]he 
(perceived) unlistability of all possible outcomes” (O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985, p. 
62).  For Keynes, institutions while not eliminating uncertainty, attempt to control it.  
To see Keynes as a complexity management theorist broadens the scope and 
relevance of his insights from economics to politics, and from politics to education. 
For all institutions play a crucial role in sustaining life and achieving equilibrium of 
forces.   
 
Complexity and education 
 
Keynes arguments for the economy regarding uncertainty, risk, and ignorance, as the 
outcome of complex determinations are applicable outside of the economy narrowly 
defined, and can be seen to apply to other areas: welfare, various forms of assistance 
for disability and critical need; matters of urgency or crisis (floods, tornados, 
tsunamis, hurricanes, etc.); health, or education or training.   
 
In this quest for complexity reduction education is a central institution, as was 
recognised by John Dewey, who explored the role and function of education in 
adapting to and coping with uncertainty in the environment.  For Dewey, education 
was conceptualised not as a discipline-based mode of instruction in ‘the basics’ but 
according to a inter-disciplinary, discovery-based curricula defined according to 
problems in the existing environment.  As Dewey says in Experience and Nature, 
“The world must actually be such as to generate ignorance and inquiry: doubt and 
hypothesis, trial and temporal conclusions….” (1929: p. 41).  The rules of living and 
habits of mind represent a ‘quest for certainty’ in an unpredictable, uncertain and 
dangerous world (p. 41).  For Dewey, the ability to organise experience proceeded 
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functionally in terms of problems encountered which needed to be overcome in order 
to construct and navigate a future. In terms of learning theory, Dewey used the 
concept of ‘continuity’ in order to theorise the link between existing experience and 
the future based upon the “interdependence of all organic structures and processes 
with one another” (1929: p. 295).  Learning for Dewey thus represented a cooperative 
and collaborative activity centred upon experiential, creative responses to contingent 
sets of relations to cope with uncertainty.  As such, Dewey’s approach conceptualizes 
part and whole in a dynamic interaction, posits the learner as interdependent with the 
environment, as always in a state of becoming, giving rise to a dynamic and forward-
looking notion of agency as experiential and collaborative. In such a model learning is 
situational in the sense of always being concerned with contingent and unique events 
in time.  
 
Central to such a complexity approach, in that learning must deal with the uncertainty 
of contingently assembled actions and states of affairs, and by so doing it transforms 
itself from an undertaking by discrete individuals into one that is shared and collective 
activity. In terms of navigating a future in relation to economics, politics, or social 
decisions, it places the educational emphasis upon the arts of coordination.  It is 
through plan or pattern coordination that institutions function and that a future is 
embarked upon.  Because in planning one must assume incomplete information due to 
the dispersal of knowledge across social systems, such coordination can be more or 
less exact or loosely stochastic and probabilistic in terms of overcoming uncertainty.  
Because learning is time-dependent, and individuals and communities are always 
experiencing unique features of their worlds, uncertainty cannot be eliminated.  
Hence, all that is possible is pattern coordination in open-ended systems, where 
planning is formed around ‘typical’ rather than ‘actual’ features.  Such plan or pattern 
coordination can only be a constructed order. Constructing plans becomes the agenda 
for education for life in Dewey’s sense.  Dewey ultimately held to the faith, as Keynes 
did, that despite unpredictability and uncertainty, the macro-societal (or macro-
economic) coordination of core social problems was possible.  
 
Such a complexity approach is also pertinent for new research in the sociology of 
education for such approaches can contribute to the study of nonlinear dynamics in 
order to better understand schooling.  Rather than view the social system in the image 
of traditional social science, inspired by Newtonian mechanics, as a linear system of 
predictable interactions, the approach of both Hobson and Keynes highlights the 
emergent character of social systems as self-organising non-linear and evolving 
systems characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability and emphasising both 
determinism and chance in the nature of events.  What characterizes an emergent 
phenomena is that it it cannot be characterised reductively solely in terms of an 
aggregative product of the entities or parts of a system,  understood through linear 
mechanistic causal analysis, in terms of the already known behaviours and natures of 
the parts, which are themselves ontologically represented as constants, but must be 
seen non-reductively in relation to their contingent self-organistion in terms of 
nonlinear dynamics as well as a theory of real time and of emergent phenomena. 
Schooling in such a view is characterised as a dynamic system whose states change 
with time through iteration, nonlinearity and self-organisation.  Such an approach 
does not displace traditional mechanistic linear analyses such as those that assert 
correlations between social class and educational attainment but supplement them. It 
enables a more nuanced consideration of their variabilities.  For the sociology of 
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education this has the advantage of forging a new reconciliation of the micro-macro 
issues, enabling a theory of social life where levels of analysis between individual and 
group, as well as determinism and human agency, can be more accurately assessed.  
Its mission becomes that of describing and explaining the complexity of systems and 
their changes, starting from a conception of the whole, while avoiding an exclusive 
emphasis on atoms or sensations which characterised the old Newtonian paradigm.  It 
offers the scope of supplementing linear mathematical analyses with non-linear 
mathematical or qualitative analyses for addressing issues of future concern.  
Theoretically, too, it enables a new approach to the modelling of social systems where 
the parts of a system interact, combine and modify or change in novel and 
unpredictable ways, and where the parts themselves may change in the process. In 
this, it enables us to better understand the role of individuals and of human agency in 
relation to systems, institutions, and cultural patterns; how decisions of the will may 
introduce into the course of events a new unexpected and changeable force; how the 
moral qualities of individuals can alter the course of history; and why, as some older 
sociological and philosophical approaches tended to maintain, such phenomena as the 
qualities of individuals, or actions in life, cannot be explained solely by general 
sociological laws of development, social class attributes, or cultural patterns. 
Although individuals are constituted by external social forces, given that time and 
space individuate those forces, the products of social evolution are inevitably unique 
and, in addition, through the exercise of imagination, choice operates to forge a 
conception of freedom quite compatible with the social production of selves.  Such an 
account thus makes possible more historical forms of method where contingency 
(both dependent causality, mutability, and uncertainty), as well as novelty, free 
choice, creativity, and unpredictability become integral elements of the research 
approach and where top-down forms of deductive reasoning must be balanced by 
bottom-up analyses of individual or group agency and social interaction.  
 
Finally, to conclude, we can also note that contemporary sociological approaches, 
such as that of Michel Foucault, contain complexity accounts of change of relevance 
for extending work in the sociology of education.  Foucault’s notion of dispotif, or 
apparatus, as a “strategic assemblage” enables a conceptualization of the school 
within a new pluralist reconciliation of part and whole simultaneously balancing the 
poles, as he calls them,  of “individualization” and “totalization.”  For Foucault, the 
dispotif was defined as “ a resolutely heterogeneous grouping comprising discourses, 
institutions, architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions, in 
sum, the said and the not-said, these are elements of apparatus.  The apparatus is itself 
the network that can be established between these elements” (Foucault,1980: 194)  In 
this conception, Foucault makes it clear that the apparatus permits a duality of 
articulation between discourse and material forms which varies contingently and 
operates in non-linear ways resisting linear, mechanical, causal explanations of the 
traditional Newtonian sort.  It is in this sense that every form is a contingently 
expressed compound of relations between forces.  Such multiple articulations are 
indeed essential to his idea of how an entity or construct constitutes its being in time, 
to his conception of historical change, as well as to his conception of strategy as a 
non-subjective intentionality; that is, as an order that cannot be reduced to a single 
strategist, or underlying cause or actor, but which nevertheless has intelligibility at the 
level of the society or institutions that emerges from an assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements, operating contingently and unpredictably within time and space. For 
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Foucault, phenomena like sexuality, security and normalisation constitute such 
strategic assemblages. In such a model, as for Dewey, the school functions as a 
stabilizing mechanism which reduces or manages complexity constituting it as a 
variably and contingently constituted disciplinary strategy within life itself.  Issues 
such as ‘early school leaving’, ‘employability,’ or ‘the curricula’ define the school as 
such a stabilizing institution concerned to adapt education to labour market 
requirements and citizens to society. In such a model the school is an institution that 
enables the navigation of an uncertain future. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Other forms of emergentist materialism in western thought, see Bunge (1977), Haken (1977, 1990), 
Eve, Horsfall and Lee (1997). 
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 For another view of complexity theory, see Kauffman (1993, and 1995). Kauffman suggests that 
while events can be seen as having antecedent conditions which explain them, in open environments 
the possible combinations are unpredictable. Other characteristics of complex systems are that they do 
not operate near equilibrium; the relationships between components are non-linear and dynamic; 
elements do not have fixed positions; the relationships between elements are not stable; and there are 
always more possibilities than can be actualized. 
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 Prigogine mostly applies these ideas to physical systems, but does sometimes demonstrate their 
applicability to the social and human world. Discussing his theories of time and irreversibility, he notes 
how all events (e.g., “a marriage is an irreversible event” (2003: 67). The consequence of irreversibility 
is that “it leads to probabilistic descriptions, which cannot be reduced to individual trajectories or wave 
functions corresponding to Newtonian or Quantum mechanics” (p. 75).  
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 Prigogine’s publications date from 1964 until shortly before his death in 2003. 
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 This involves a different description at the level of physics of elementary processes and a reversal of 
classical physics which saw systems as integrable, leading to determinism, and premised on time 
reversibility and equilibrium (as from Newton to Poincaré). Prigogine’s approach replaces classical and 
Quantum mechanics in a concern for thermodynamics and probability and emphasizes variables such 
as noise, stochasticity, irreversibility.  Such an approach suggests distinct limits to reductionism 
  
6
 In this, he differs from Einstein who saw time as an illusion, as well as from classical mechanics..  He 
acknowledges debts to Bergson (Prigogine, 2003, p. 19-20); to Heidegger (2003, 9), and to Heraclitus 
(2003, p. 9, 10).  
 
7
 Interconnectedness means that “individualities emerge from the global,” and counters the idea that 
“evolution is independent of environment” (2003, p. 54). 
 
8
 Pomian (1990) discusses issues such as determinism and chance in relation to Prigogine’s work. Also 
see Prigogine (1997) 
 
9
 Hobson adopted a number of Ruskin’s phrases, and this is one of them. I cite from Long, 1996, p. 18.  
 
10
 Surplus was either productive, through labour and cooperation, or unproductive, through rents, 
interests, or profit. 
 
11
 Hobson gives the example of three persons building a boat to illustrate how through cooperation, 
each can contribute to something that individually they could not have produced (See Hobson, 1996, 
pp. 146-147). 
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